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ABSTRACT 
The paper estimates the respective contributions of legal, economic, political and 
social institutions on inequalities within countries across the globe, while using 
various measures of openness and trade policy as our control group. The results 
suggest that institutions have significant effects on inequality. Among legal 
institutions, rule of law and control for corruption have a stronger impact on 
inequality than voice and accountability. Though we find that countries which 
practice democracy are less prone to unequal outcomes, we also find that autocratic 
setups may not necessarily lead to greater inequalities. Both frameworks may carry 
redistributive effects, as both are found to be positively associated with the incomes of 
the poorest and negatively associated with the incomes of the richest. Secondly, 
whether a country is politically stable is rather a more decisive institutional factor 
apropos inequality than whether a country has an autocratic or a democratic 
orientation. Economic institutions also seem to play an important role in alleviating 
inequalities within countries. Whether the government is functioning effectively and 
whether it has a robust fiscal and monetary policy seems to have stronger impact on 
inequality than regulatory quality. Education for all, a proxy for social institutions, 
has a strong redistributive power. Overall, legal institutions trump any other 
institutional categories in reducing inequalities in a country. On the other hand, 
middle income group is most likely to benefit from good functioning institutions than 
any other income group. 
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1. Introduction:
During the 1950s, 1960s and most of the 1970s inequality followed declining trends 
in the most developed and developing countries. However, the inequality trends have 
been reversed in most countries since the early 1980s. First, inequality started rising 
in the mid- to late- 1970s in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and the 
New Zealand, which were the first among the OECD countries to adopt a neoliberal 
policy approach. In United Kingdom the increase in inequality was quite pronounced 
as the Gini coefficient of the distribution of net disposable income rose more than 30 
percent between 1978 and 1991, which was twice as fast as that recorded in United 
States for the same period. The Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands were next 
to follow where inequality followed a U shaped pattern. From 1970 to 80, Finland and 
France also experienced a halt in declining trends in inequality. In Italy inequality 
rose by 4 points between 1992 and 1995. In 1993 the Gini coefficient for Japan stood 
at 0.44, which is approximately the same as United States and far higher than the likes 
of Sweden and Denmark. Most of this increase in income inequality in these 
industrialised countries is explained by a rise in earnings inequality (Cornia et al, 
2004). Since 1989, inequality in the transition countries of Central Europe has also 
witnessed increasing trends but they remain modest when compared to former USSR 
and Southeastern Europe where the Gini coefficients rose on average by 10-20 points 
which is 304 times faster than the Gini in Central Europe. The rise in inequality in this 
region has been attributed to rise in returns to education following liberalisation 
(Rutkowski, 1999). 
Partly due to the recession in the 1980s, which hit the poor harder than the rich, 
inequality in most Latin American states except for three (Colombia, Uruguay and 
Costa Rica) witness sharp rise. Gini coefficients in Latin America have been ranged 
between 0.45 and 0.60 since early 1950s, which are among the highest in the world. 
The acute polarisation of income has been rooted in a highly unequal distribution of 
land and educational opportunities (Cornia et al, 2004). 
In China income concentration has been rising rapidly since 1985 so that the Gini 
coefficient reached 0.43 by 1995 and remained more or less at the same level until 
recently. The rise in income disparity can be attributed to a rise in urban-rural divide 
arising from a faster expansion of urban activities amid active participation of China 
in international markets. Among South East Asian economies, the Gini coefficient for 
Indonesia increased to 0.38 by 1997 from 0.32 in 1987-90.In South Asia, the 
inequality also followed a U-shaped pattern, though it was less pronounced. In India, 
the experience of 1990s points to a moderate rise in both urban and rural inequality 
and a larger rise in overall inequality due to widening gap between urban and rural 
areas. In 1990s the urban inequality rose to 0.36. The Gini coefficient in Pakistan rose 
from 0.39 in 1960s to 0.41 in 1990s. Much like India, the rise in overall inequality is 
attributed to a sharp rise in rural inequalities. Inequality in Sub Saharan Africa has 
been among the highest in world. There is some evidence of falling urban-rural gap 
but there is rising intra urban and at times intra rural inequalities. For example, in 
Tnazania the Gini coefficient for rural inequality rose from 0.53 in early 1980s to 0.76 
in early 1990s. Similarly for Kenya, the rural inequalities increased by 9 points from 
1980 to 1992 and stand at 0.49 (Ibid, 2004).
In the retrospect, the problem of poverty can not be separated from the way in which 
growth is achieved.  Hence, today the principle issue in pro poor growth debate also 
relates to inequality.  The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of one of the key 
determinant of growth on inequality. Recent literature suggests that strong 
institutions1 are the key determinant of growth ( i.e, see Dollar and Kraay, 2003; 
Rodrik et al, 2004; Glaeser et al, 2004a, Mamoon and Murshed, 2005). It is important 
to look at the different institutional setups; countries may have while working along 
with the surge of globalisation. For example, India is a thriving democracy but China, 
South Korea and Taiwan have been growing under one-party dictatorships, the last 
two eventually turning to democracy. Recently, Pakistan has become one of the 
fastest growing economies of the region, even out passing India, under rule of General 
Pervez Musharraf. Among the transition economies, rapid economic growth was 
achieved by Kazakhstan under Nazarbaev. Here one may conveniently assume that 
these countries have performed well under market friendly policies (i.e., trade 
liberalisation) and thus successfully achieved robust economic performance. However 
the analogy is not that simple. Market friendly policies may not work in the absence 
of good institutions. The failure of Russian economy and its reform process can be 
attributed to the lack of a supportive legal, regulatory and political apparatus. In Latin 
America little attention has been paid to the mechanisms of social insurance and to the 
safety nets which has resulted in the dissatisfaction with market oriented reforms. It 
may also be the case that some institutions may be more important than others. For 
example, even pro-market dictators can secure property rights as a matter of policy 
choice (Glaeser, 2004a). Similarly, stronger social institutions lead to improved 
government functioning: “Education is needed for courts to operate and to empower 
citizens to engage with government institutions (Ibid, 2004: 3)”.
1 In this paper we have assumed education, which would otherwise be considered as a proxy for human 
capital, as a social institution.
This paper tries to analyse different institutional settings, and their relationship with 
various definitions of inequality to shed light on the effects of pro growth policies on 
poverty. 
2. Different Types of Institutions, Inequality and the Endogenising Factors:
Figure 1:  Endogeniety between Institutions, Integration and Inequality
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There are issues of two way causality between inequality and institutions (i.e., see 
Keefer and Knack, 2002; Chong and Gradstein, 2004), between different types of 
institutions as shown by figure 1 and discussed below. Many recent studies ( i.e., see 
Chen and Ravallion , 2003; Cockburn, 2001; Friedman, 2000; Lofgren, 1999) show 
that international trade is significantly related with inequality while institutions and 
integration are also endogenous (i.e., Rodrik et al, 2004). Any empirical analysis 
which takes institutions as a pure exogenous factor while analysing its effects on 
inequality may lead to miss-specification bias. Here on the line of Ridrik et al (2004), 
we assume geography is a pure exogenous concept.
 
Chong and Gradstein (2004) find strong evidence of bi-directional causality between 
institutions and inequality. Inequality may affect the quality of institutions. For 
example, high inequality will prevent the poor from investing in education or the 
ruling class may not invest in education so that the poor majority will not be 
politically active thus undermining the development of necessary social and political 
institutions. Easterly (2001) and Keefer and Knack (2002) suggests that social 
polarisation negatively affects institutional quality. 
The countries with poor institutions are also likely to have high inequality. For 
example in Russia in the 1990s, a small group of entrepreneurs exploited their 
political power to promote their own interests, subverting the emergence of 
institutions committed to the protection of smaller share holders and businesses. 
According to the Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency 
International, among the transition economies, Estonia is placed 28, and Hungary 31; 
whereas Russia is placed 79, and Ukraine 83. In these transition economies, weak 
performance of public institutions, infringement of property rights in favour of 
influential parties, lower willingness to use courts to resolve business disputes, lower 
level of tax compliance and higher levels of bribery all have been strongly correlated 
with inequality (Hellman and Kaufman, 2002). Similarly, in several Latin American 
countries, the ruling elites, the military and large businesses impeded smaller business 
interests giving rise to significant informal sector. Chong and Gradstein (2004) show 
that when the political bias in favour of the rich is large, income inequality and poor 
institutional quality may reinforce each other, indicating endogeniety between the 
two.
There may also be inter-linkages between various institutions. For example, nearly all 
developed countries are democracies and most developing countries are either run 
under one party system, dictatorships or military regimes. The countries with lower 
levels of economic and human development tend to have lower levels of education, 
limited political rights, weak or non existent political competition, lower level of 
economic freedom and openness, ethno linguistic factionalism, the lack of judicial 
independence and a free press and high levels of permissiveness towards corruption.  
Before discussing the interdependence of different institutions we would first like to 
differentiate between them. We identify four types of institutions: 1) Legal, 2) 
Political, 3) Economic and 4) Social. Legal institutions capture the transparency and 
fairness of legal system, political rights of the citizens, State legitimacy, freedom of 
speech, independence of judiciary, enforceability of contracts, police effectiveness, 
access to independent and impartial courts, confidence in judicial system in insuring 
property rights, prevention of improper practices in public sphere, control of 
corruption etc. Political institutions represent political stability, democracy, autocracy 
or dictatorship. Economic institutions include state effectiveness at collecting taxes or 
other forms of government revenue, states ability to create, deliver and maintain vital 
national infrastructure, states ability to respond effectively to domestic economic 
problems, independence of government economic policies from pressure from special 
interest groups, trade and foreign exchange system, competition policy, privatisation, 
banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, securities market and non bank 
financial institutions etc. Social Institutions capture socio economic conditions such 
as health, education and nutrition etc. 
The Legal, political, economic and social institutions are strong in developed 
countries and for developing countries there are mixed experiences. For example, 
intellectual property rights are protected vigorously in the US and most advanced 
societies, but not in many developing countries (Rodrik, 1999). Similarly, most rich 
countries in the world circa 1960 were democracies with well-educated populations. 
Over the subsequent 40 years, these countries grew rapidly, on average and the 
dispersion of their growth rates was relatively small. Most poor countries in the world 
circa 1960 were dictatorships with badly educated populations. These countries did 
not grow as rapidly as the democracies on average, but perhaps more strikingly, the 
dispersion of growth rates across these countries has been huge (Glaeser et al, 
2004b:3). Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) link the development of public education as 
a social institution to the democratization as a political process in US. According to 
them, while starting at about the similar level of development in the 18nth century, 
US led the way in setting up a system of common schools and promoting literacy, 
where as in countries in South America and the Caribbean these processes were much 
delayed. Today specifically for the Carribean’s, the economic development problems 
are associated with region’s lack of diverse and open economies, government 
ownership of inefficient state enterprises, continued restrictive tariff barriers, failure 
to institute free trade measures and the lack of governance measures (Collier, 2002). 
Gupta et al (1998) finds that if government officials use their authority for private 
gain and indulge in corruption that affects the effectiveness of social spending and the 
formation of human capital by perpetuating an unequal distribution of asset ownership 
and unequal access to education. Corruption also affects the government effectiveness 
as it weakens tax administration and can lead to tax evasion and improper tax evasion 
and improper tax exemptions. Higher corruption is associated with increases in 
inequalities in education, land distribution and health spending. Wealthy urban elites 
can lobby the government to bias social expenditure toward higher education and 
tertiary health, which tend to benefit high income groups (Ibid, 1998). 
3. Data and Methodology: 
Much recently Kaufman et al (2002) formulated aggregate governance indicators for 
six dimensions of governance covering 175 countries.  They relied on 194 different 
measures of governance drawn from 17 different sources of subjective governance 
data constructed by 15 different sources including international organizations, 
political and business risk rating agencies, think tanks and non governmental 
organizations. The governance indicators have been oriented so that higher values 
correspond to better outcomes on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5. They are categorized as rule 
of law (Rl), political stability (Ps), regulatory quality (Rq), government effectiveness 
(Ge), voice and accountability (Va) and control of corruption (Ctc).  We divide them 
into four classification based on their definitions. We consider Rl, Va and Ctc as legal 
institutions. Ge and Rq are dubbed as economic institutions whereas Ps is taken as a 
proxy for Political institutions. We add two more political indicators namely 
democracy (Demo) and autocracy (Auto) to our analysis from Polity dataset whereas, 
both ranging from 0 to 10. We have also included social institutions in our analysis. 
Average Schooling Years in the total population at 25 (Sch) and Adult literacy rate 
(Altr) capture the quality of social institutions. 
As we mention above, international trade is also a significant determinant of 
inequalities in countries across the globe, integration enters our regression model to 
enhance its explanatory power. We incorporate not 1 but 8 various concepts of 
openness and trade policy in our regression model in order to carry out a robustness 
check for our results on institutions. We have carefully chosen three specific measures 
of openness. The ratio of nominal imports plus exports to GDP (lcopen) is the 
conventional openness indicator (see Frankel and Romer, 1999; Alcala and Ciccone, 
2002; Rose, 2002; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Rodrik et al, 2004). Two other measures 
of openness are overall trade penetration (tarshov) derived from World Bank’s TARS 
system and overall import penetration (Impnov) respectively (see Rose, 2002). Neither 
of these measures are direct indicators of trade policy of a country, pointing only 
towards the level of its participation in international trade. There are indicators of 
trade restrictiveness acting as measures of trade policy (Edwards, 1998; Greenaway et 
al, 2001, Rose 2002). Import tariffs as percentage of imports (Tariffs), tariffs on 
intermediate inputs and capital goods (Owti), trade taxes as a ratio of overall trade 
(Txtrg) and total import charges (Totimpov) can all be considered as good proxies for 
trade restrictiveness and have also been employed in our study. Other measures which 
capture restrictions in overall trade are non-tariff barriers. We use overall non-tariff 
coverage (Ntarfov) and non-tariff barriers on intermediate inputs and capital goods 
(Owqi) as two proxies for non-tariff barriers (see Rose, 2002). Moreover there is also 
a trend in the trade literature to use composite measures of trade policy. Edwards 
(1998) advocates the Sachs and Warner (1995) openness index (Open80) as a proxy 
for openness.
To capture inequality we not only take GINI income inequality index (Gini) from 
UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) but also we employ UTIP-
UNIDO Theil measure (Theil) calculated by University of Texas Inequality Project 
(UTIP) which captures wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour. This is 
motivated by several considerations. First, comparable and consistent measures of 
income inequality, whether on a household level or per head basis are difficult, almost 
implausible and generally fails to provide adequate or accurate longitudinal and cross-
country coverage. On the other hand, inequality of manufacturing pay, based on 
UNIDO Industrial Statistics provides indicators of inequality that are more stable, 
more reliable and more comparable across countries because UNIDO measures are 
based on a two or three digit code of International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC) a single systematic accounting framework. Furthermore, manufacturing pay 
has been measured with reasonable accuracy as a matter of official routine in most 
countries around the world for nearly forty years (Galbraith and Kum, 2002).   Further 
more we take income deciles and percentiles from UNU/WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) as other proxies of inequality. Institutions or Integration 
will be guilty of inequality if it has the negative impact on the incomes of  bottom 10 
percent (low10) and positive impact on the income of the top 10 percent (high 10). 
We also take income groups divided into quintiles where the effect of Institutions is 
anticipated to be negative for the ratio between top 20 percent and bottom 20 percent 
(high20/low20) and positive for the middle income groups (Middle20). The exercise 
on income deciles and percentiles will further shed light on how institutions and 
integration are related with income distribution. Especially, we are interested to know 
how quality of institutions are related with the incomes of the middle class or the ones 
living in bottom of income share. Each country observation for all inequality 
measures is taken for the latest year for which data is available and in most cases 
represent inequality in mid 1990s.
Our basic inequality and income share equations would look like:
Inequality = f (Institutions, Integration, Geography) …………......... (1)
and    Income Share= f (Institutions, Integration, Geography)………(2)
Corresponding to equation 1, our inequality model based on Theil index has 8 
equations, whereas each equation corresponds to a different institutional or integration 
classification The model specifications for Gini, High20/Low20, Midlle20, Low10 and 
High10 contain same 8 equations each with same variable specifications. 
……………3iiii OpenLITheil 11111  
…………..4iiii OpenPITheil 22222  
…………...5iiii OpenEITheil 33333  
……………6iiii OpenSITheil 44444  
………………7iiii TPLITheil 55555  
………………8iiii TPPITheil 66666  
………………9iiii TPEITheil 77777  
……………….10iiii TPSITheil 88888  
The variable is Theil Index in a country i, , , , and are respectively iTheil iLI iPI iEI iSI
measures for legal, political, economic and social institutions, whereas iOpen
measures general openness in the economy and  is a measure for trade policy and iTP
 is the random error term. Please refer to appendix 1 for information on equations i
based on Gini, High20/Low20, Middle20, Low20 and High10.
As we have discussed, there are potential endogenity problems between institutions 
and integration and between institutions and inequality itself. To this effect we have 
first regressed our institutional, trade policy and openness proxies on a set of 
instruments. Frankel and Romer (1999) suggests that we can instrument for openness 
by using trade/GDP shares constructed on the basis of a gravity equation for bilateral 
trade flows. The FR approach consists of first regressing bilateral trade flows (as a 
share of country’s GDP) on measures of country mass, distance between the trade 
partners, and a few other geographical variables, and then constructing a predicted 
aggregate trade share for each country on the basis of coefficients estimated. Hall and 
Jones (1999) employed distance from the equator and the extent to which the primary 
languages of Western Europe are spoken as first languages today as instruments for 
institutions.  Hall and Jones made an argument that the instruments are not correlated 
with the error term. Acemolgu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) identify  the mortality 
of European settlers as a potential instrument. Using two ex post assessments of 
institutional quality- risk of expropriation by the government and constraints on the 
executive- as measures of institutions, they showed that settler mortality is a strong 
predictor of institutions. However there are two drawbacks for AJR instrument. First,  
the data is only available for 64 countries. Though Rodrik et al (2004) have extended 
it to 80 countries; it still covers a relatively low number when compared to ‘the extent 
to which the primary languages of Western Europe are spoken as first languages 
today’ which covers as many as 140 countries. Secondly, according to Glaeser et al 
(2004b), AJR instrument of settler mortality fails to be orthogonal to the error term. 
‘Settler mortality is strongly correlated not just with ancient, but also with the 
modern, decease environment, suggesting that it might be the decease environment, 
rather than history, that matters for economic development. Secondly settler mortality 
is strongly correlated with human capital accumulation, suggesting that it cannot be 
used as an instrument for institutions (Glasear et al, 2004b:8).’ Thus following Dollar 
and Kraay (2003) and Hall and Jones (1999), we use ‘fractions of the population 
speaking English (Engfrac) and Western European languages as the first language 
(Eurfrac)’ as an instrument for legal, economic and political institutions. Since we are 
using years of schooling and adult literacy rate as a proxy for social institutions we 
looked for instruments which can capture the qualitative and quantitative properties in 
education sector. Total public spending on education (as a percentage of GDP) and 
primary public-teacher ratio are the two instruments proposed by Mamoon and 
Murshed (2005). The former instrument captures the quality of education and the later 
instrument captures the quantity of education. As in Rodrik et al (2004), we employ 
‘distance from the equator’ as another instrument (proxy for geography) also 
employed by Hall and Jones (1999).
………………..11iiiii DisteqFREurEngLI 111111  
………………12iiiii DisteqFREurEngPI 222222  
……………….13iiiii DisteqFREurEngEI 333333  
……….......14iiiii DisteqFREurEngOpen 4444441  
……………....15iiiii DisteqFREurEngTP 5555551  
………………..16iiiii DisteqFRPtrTlexSI 666666  
……………17iiiii DisteqFRPtrTlexOpen 7777772  
………………..18iiiii DisteqFRPtrTlexTP 8888882  
Where  and are our instruments for legal, economic and political iEng iEur
institutions referring to fractions of population speaking English and European 
languages respectively. Tlex is total public spending on education as a percentage of 
GDP and Ptr is primary pupil-teacher ratio and both are instruments for average years 
of schooling and adult literacy rate. is instrument for openness and trade policy. iFR
 is proxy for geography showing distance from the equator. At the second iDisteq
stage the predicted values of respective institutional, openness and trade policy 
variables are employed in the inequality and income share equations. 
4. Results: 
4.1. Legal Institutions: 
Barreto (1996) finds that corruption is positively and significantly correlated with 
inequality, implying that increased income inequality is associated with greater 
corruption. Tanzi (1995) argues that the benefits from corruption are likely to accrue 
to the better connected individuals in society, who mostly belong to high-income 
groups.  It has been further contended that corruption creates incentives for higher 
investment in capital intensive projects and lower investment in labor intensive 
projects (UNDP, 1997), thus increasing the wage inequality. Gupta et al (1998) show 
that a worsening of corruption index of a country by one standard deviation (2.52 
points on a scale of 0 to 10) is associated with an increase in the GINI coefficient of 
about 4.4 points.
The results (Table 1; appendix 1) suggest that wage inequality (Theil) is more 
sensitive to legal institutions than overall income distribution (Gini). Results based on 
the ratio of income percentiles (High20/Low20) and income deciles show that voice 
and accountability, rule of law and control for corruption has a strong redistributive 
power. The relationship between legal institutions and income of the middle income 
groups (Middle20) as well as low income groups especially for Rl and Ctc is positive 
and significant. This means that good quality legal institutions not only to reach out to 
the middle income groups but they are also altruistic to the poorest of the poor.  The 
evidence quite robustly suggests that redistribution of income takes place from the 
richest to the middle class or lower middle class as all the three proxies of legal 
institutions are negatively and significantly related with the incomes of the richest 10 
percent or 20 percent in most of the cases. 
4.2. Economic Institutions: 
Every government must maintain a sustainable fiscal policy, which includes a deficit 
that is manageable in the short term, and the associated public debt it creates being 
serviceable.  More concentration of resources on social sector is always pro-poor. The 
value added tax has received exaggerated appreciation and has not faced its due 
criticism. In the world when poverty reduction strategies are implemented and 
inequalities are growing, value added tax needs to give way to more pro poor tax 
system (Roy and Weeks, 2003). Inflation in many developing countries is an outcome 
of political decision when government has a lax monetary policy and is unable or 
unwilling to increase taxes. High inflation has a negative distribution effects. In 
developed countries sometimes monetary policy outcomes are related with increased 
inequalities.  Khalifa (2005), shows that a positive shock to Federal Reserve fund 
rates in US induce a larger and more persistent increase in the unemployment ratio of 
the low skilled relative to that of high skilled, indicating that low skilled bear the 
brunt of the increase in unemployment after a contractionary policy. 
Result summary in table 1 (appendix I) indicates that government effectiveness is 
negatively and significantly related with wage inequality between skilled and 
unskilled. However, the relationship is weak at best with Gini. Though it doesn’t 
mean that effectiveness of government policies don’t carry redistributive effects. Our 
results show that if the governments which work in the interest of public; they have a 
significant and positive effect on the incomes of the poor and middle class, where as 
they are negatively and significantly related with the incomes of the elite. The results 
in Table 1 indicate that though regulatory quality has weak relationship with the 
traditional measures of inequality but it has positive and relatively significant effects 
on the income share of middle income groups. 
4.3. Political Institutions: 
The results in table 1 indicate that political stability is one of the key factors to a more 
equal society and it is especially favourable to the wages of the unskilled population. 
Furthermore, politically stable societies not only redistribute incomes to the middle 
income groups but they also benefit the lowest segments of the society equally. 
However, in comparison to political stability index, democracy has a weak 
relationship with inequality.  It doesn’t seem to matter much whether a country works 
under a democratised framework or an autocracy, the average effects on inequality 
have generally been insignificant. This is inline with the existing evidence which 
doesn’t find any robust relationship between democracy and inequality in a cross 
country regression. ‘Indeed a casual inspection of recent events in East Europe as well 
as in East Asia casts doubts that any such simple relationship may exist. It has been 
argued that, in the East European countries, democratization of the 90’s actually 
resulted in an increase income inequality. Similarly, some of the East Asian countries 
such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore have had among the most egalitarian income 
distributions in the world, yet their political record is far from democratic. (Gradstein 
et al, 2001: 1)’. According to Glaeser et al (2004b), it is good leadership that matters 
and not whether a country has democratic setup or ruled under a dictatorship. 
Nevertheless, our results do show that democracy seem to favour middle class more 
than anybody else confirming the median voter argument that democratised countries 
with greater inequality of factor income tend to redistribute more to the less affluent 
(Milanovic, 2000).  This result may also seem much in line with current political set 
up initiated by the government of General Pervez Musharraf, whereby Pakistan may 
score low in democracy but has seen significant political stability, so much so that it 
seems that it would be the first time in the history of Pakistan a government will be 
able to complete its 5 year period. This political stability has been combined with a 
accelerated economic performance with increasing incomes of especially middle 
class. 
4.4. Social Institutions: 
Education enhances the earnings potential of the poor, both in competing for jobs and 
earnings and as a source of growth and employment.  The distribution of physical and 
human capital emerges from the theoretical and empirical literature as the key to 
distributional consequences of growth, and a determinant of growth itself (Kanbur, 
1998:20). The results (table 1; appendix I) show that average years of schooling (Sch) 
is negatively related with the Gini, and the relationship is significant in most cases 
suggesting countries which have a more educated population are also the ones where 
distribution of income is relatively less unequal. For example, in US the percapita 
income of the richest decile exceeds that of second richest decile by 60 percent only, 
where as in Latin America where Gini is also one of the highest among developing 
countries, the richest decile exceeds that of the second richest decile by 160 percent. 
In comparison to Latin America, US has highly educated population with average 
years of schooling at little more than 12 years and 99 percent of the adult population 
being literate.  
Increased educational attainment also leads to less wage inequality. Along with the 
processes of globalisation the comparative advantage of developed nation lies in high 
skill intensive goods as lower skill intensive goods and services are being outsourced 
to developing nations. As the skill demand is increasing at greater pace than its 
supply, so is the wage of more skilled and educated labor thus increasing wage 
inequalities in developed nations.  Harrigan and Balaban (1999) show that relative 
factor supply is an important factor in determining the growing return to skill in US 
during 1963-91. Given the current situation of increasing inequality in most 
developed societies, of which globalisation is a much-cited culprit, policy makers 
have been very keen to demand further public funding for schooling (Pereira and 
Martin, 2000: 2). Similarly education inequalities have led to wage inequality in 
developing countries specifically Latin America. Coincidently, Latin America has a 
Gini coefficient (about 0.50 for the region as a whole) which is approximately 15 
points above the average for the rest of the world (Mamoon, 2005). Londoño and 
Székely (1997) estimate that the low level of education of Latin American workers 
and the enormous inequality in educational assets account for the largest portion of 
the region's excessive inequality, larger than other contributing factors -- lower 
physical capital accumulation, the relative abundance of natural resources, and a high 
concentration of land resources. In Latin America, only a relatively small proportion 
of the total population has completed secondary or higher education. These relatively 
few skilled workers earn a substantial wage premium due to their limited supply. Thus 
a poor distribution of education contributes to differentials in the returns to different 
levels of education, magnifying the effect of education gaps on income inequality.
Our results show that average years of schooling and adult literacy rate are 
significantly and negatively related with wage inequality, confirming that countries 
where education is more equally distributed or levels of average schooling are higher; 
wage inequality would be less severe. Though Altr is quite weakly related with the 
our inequality measures, results for Sch do imply that education has a strong 
redistributive power from richer segments of the society to the less affluent. A 
comparison of coefficients of Middle20 and Low10 suggests that education benefits 
middle class more than the poor. 
Conclusions:
 This paper is an attempt to gauge the effects of different institutions on inequality. 
Though the literature is limited on the subject, the existing one suggests that there is 
two way causality between institutions and inequality. To this effect we solve the 
problem of endogeniety by utilising a set of instruments already in use for institutions. 
We used a rich set of openness and trade policy variables as controls in our multiple 
regression equations. This was done to also check the robustness of our results for 
institutions while increasing the explanatory power of our model. 
Our results have reconfirmed that good quality institutions lead to decrease in 
inequality. It also appears that it is political stability that is more important than 
democracy. In line to previous studies, we find that it may not matter much whether a 
country is working under a democracy or autocracy, but it is good policies of the 
leaders which eventually determine the welfare enhancing effects through 
preservation of property rights etc. Good leadership which not only follow more 
market friendly policies but also keep institutional development at the fore of their 
policy choice is a key to economic development. On the basis of our relative 
significance, social and legal institutions are by far the most significant institutions 
apropos inequality suggesting their relative importance over other institutions. Rule of 
law is the best performing institution viz-a-viz inequality mitigation. If education is 
more equally distributed among the population, relative wages of skilled and unskilled 
labour will have least amount of distortions especially when the country opens up to 
international trade. Among economic institutions, regulation is less important when 
compared to government’s independent fiscal and monetary policy and its effective 
capacity to decentralise and its pro business orientation. The results in table 1 also 
suggest that Middle class comes out to be the main beneficiary of good quality 
institutions than any other income group as Middle20 equations give most significant 
results. 
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Appendix I: 
Table: Significance Count of Institutions under Augmented Regression Analysis for Inequalities
Independent Variables                                 Dependent Variables
Theil Gini High20/Low20 Middle20 Low10 High10  Cases of 
Significance  by 
rows                 
Total cases of 
correct signs
Legal Institutions
Voice and Accountability (Va)
    (Negative sign)
5 out of 12
(5 out of 5)
3 out of 12
(3 out of 3)
5 out of 12
(5 out of 5)
7 out of 12
(0 out of 7)
2 out of 12
(1 out of 2)*
7 out of 12
(7 out of 7)
29 out of 72
 
28 out of 29
Rule of Law (Rl)
    (Negative sign)
5 out of 12
(5 out of 5)
4 out of 12
(4 out of 4)
9 out of 12
(9 out of 9)
10 out of 12
(0 out of 10)
9 out of 12
(0 out of 9)
10 out of 12
(10 out of 10)
47 out of 72
 
47 out of 47
Control of Corruption (Ctc)
    (Negative sign)
5 out of 12
(5 out of 5)
4 out of 12
(4 out of 4)
8 out of 12
(8 out of 8)
9 out of 12
(0 out of 9)
8 out of 12
(0 out of 8)
9 out of 12
(9 out of 9)
45 out of 72 45 out of 45
Economic Institutions
Government Effectiveness (Ge)
    (Negative sign)
5 out of 12
(5 out of 5)
3 out of 12
(3 out of 3)
8 out of 12
(8 out of 8)
9 out of 12
(0 out of 9)
8 out of 12
(0 out of 8)
8 out of 12
(8 out of 8)
41 out of 72 41 out of 41
Regulatory Quality (Rq)
    (Negative sign)
3 out of 12
(3 out of 3)
2 out of 12
(2 out of 2)
2 out of 12
(2 out of 2)
6 out of 12
(0 out of 6)
1 out of 12
(1 out of 1)*
5 out of 12
(5 out of 5)
19 out of 72 18 out of 19
Political Institutions
Democracy (Dem)
    (Negative sign)
3 out of 12
(3 out of 3)
3 out of 12
(3 out of 3)
4 out of 12
(4 out of 4)
7 out of 12
(0 out of 7)
1 out of 12
(1 out of 1)*
5 out of 12
(4 out of 5)*
30 out of 72 28 out of 30
Autocracy (Aut)
    (Negative signs)
3 out of 12
(0 out of 12)
0 out of 12
(0 out of 0)
0 out of 12
(0 out of 0)
3 out of 12
(3 out of 3)
2 out of 12
(0 out of 2)*
2 out of 12
(2 out of 2)
10 out of 72 8 out of 10
Political Stability (Ps)
    (Negative sign)
5 out of 12
(5 out of 5)
4 out of 12
(4 out of 4)
8 out of 12
(8 out of 8)
9 out of 12
(0 out of 9)
8 out of 12
(0 out of 12)
9 out of 12
(9 out of 9)
53 out of 72 53 out of 53
Social Institutions
Average Schooling Years (Sch)
    (Negative sign)
9 out of 12
(9 out of 9)
6 out of 12
(6 out of 6)
6 out of 12
(6 out of 6)
7 out of 12
(0 out of 7)
5 out of 12
(0 out of 5)
6 out of 12
(6 out of 6)
39 out of 72 39 out of 39
Adult Literacy Rate (Altr)
    (Negative sign)
8 out of 12
(8 out of 8)
2 out of 12
(1 out of 2)*
1 out of 12
(1 out of 1)
1 out of 12
(1 out of 1)
3 out of 12
(1 out of 3)*
1 out of 12
(1 out of 1)
16 out of 72 14 out of 16
Cases of Significance (by columns) 51 out of 120 31 out of 120 51 out of 120 68 out of 120 47 out of 120 62 out of 120 - -
- *  Observation made that a variable has entered the equation significantly but with a wrong sign
- Significance is observed at 1%, 5% and 10% levels
DATA AND SOURCES:
Altr: Adult Literacy Rate, Year: 1999, Source: WDI (2002)
Auto: Autocracy, Year: 1999, Source: Polity IV dataset 
Ctc: Control for Corruption, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002)
Demo: Democracy, (numeric) Range = 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high), Democracy Score: general 
openness of political institutions. The 11-point Democracy scale is constructed additively. 
Year: 1999, Source: Polity IV dataset
Disteq: Distance from Equator of capital city measured as abs (Latitude)/90. Source: Rodrik, 
Subramanian & Trebbi (2002)
Engfrac: Fraction of the population speaking English. Source: Rodrik, Subramanian & 
Trebbi (2002)
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Ge: Government Effectiveness,  Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002)
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World Income Inequality Database (WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm
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Database (WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm
High20: Fifth Income Percentile, Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality 
Database (WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm 
Sch:  Average Schooling Years in the total population at 25,Year: 1999. Source: Barro R & J. W. Lee 
data set, http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html
Impnov85: Import Penetration: overall, 1985.  Source: Rose (2002).
Impnov82: Import Penetration: overall, 1982. Source: Rose (2002).
Lcopen: Natural logarithm of openness. Openness is given by the ratio of (nomnal) imports plus 
exports to GDP (in nominal US dollars), Year: 1985. Source: Penn World Tables, Mark 6.
Logfrankrom (FR) : Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed following Frankel and 
Romer (1999) from a bilateral trade equation with ‘pure geography’ variables. Source: Frankel and 
Romer (1999).
Low 10:Lowest Income Decile, Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm
Low20: First Income Percentile, Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm
Nontarfov: Non- Taiff Barriers Coverage: Overall, 1987. Source: Rose (2002).
Open80s: Sachs and Warners (1995) composite openness index. Source: Rose (2002).
Owqi: Non Trade Barriers Frequency on intermediate inputs, Capital goods, 1985. Source: Rose 
(2002).
Owti:  Tariffs on Intermediate and Capital Goods, 1985. Source: Rose (2002)
Ps: Political Stability, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002)
Ptr: Pupil Teacher Ratio, Primary, Year: 1999, Source: WDI (2002)
Rl: Rule of Law, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002)
Rq : Regulatory Quality, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002)
Tarshov85:  TARS Trade Penetration: overall, 1985. Source: Rose (2002).
Tarshov82: TARS Trade Penetration: overall, 1982. Source:  Rose (2002).
Tariffs: Import Duties as %age imports, Year:1985. Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), 
2002.
Theil: UTIP-UNIDO Wage Inequality THEIL Measure - calculated based on UNIDO2001 by UTIP, 
Year: 1997. Source: University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) http://utip.gov.utexas.edu.
Tlex: Public Spending on Education, Total (as a percentage of GDP), Year: 1999, Source: WDI (2002)
Thrd20: Third Income Percentile, Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality 
Database (WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm
Totimpov:  Weighted Average of Total Import Charges: overall, 1985. Source: Rose (2002)
Txtrg: Trade taxes / trade, 1982. Source: rose (2002)
Va: Voice and Accountability, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002)
